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Review article 
 
After Hannibal and Scipio: The Spymasters 
of India and Pakistan reflect on years of 
conflict 
 
R. Gerald Hughes and Ryan Shaffer 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace, by A.S. Dulat, Aditya Sinha, and 
Asad Durrani. Noida, India: HarperCollins India, 2018, 344 pp., ₹799.00/$29.99 (hardcover), 
ISBN: 978-9352779253. 
 
‘I sincerely hope that they (relations between India and Pakistan) will be friendly and 
cordial. We have a great deal to do, both states, and I think that we can be of use to each 
other (and to) the world.’ Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948).1 
 
‘Intelligence links between neighbours are obviously desirable. It is better to 
institutionalise them now, rather than trying to activate them in times of crisis (that is why 
they failed in [the terrorist attacks of] 26/11).2 In due course, both sides would understand 
the need for ‘open' intelligence posts in diplomatic missions. In the meantime, petty 
harassment of each other's officers and staff could end. Intelligence links can succeed 
where all others fail. What agencies can achieve is not at times even conceivable in 
political or diplomatic channels.’ A.S. Dulat and Asad Durrani.3 
 
‘Aut Viam Inveniam Aut Faciam’ Hannibal Barca (247 BC-181/3 BC).4 
 
In 193 BC the Roman general Scipio Africanus,5 who nine years earlier had effectively ended 
the Second Punic War by defeating Hannibal Barca at the Battle of Zama,6 was part of a 
delegation sent to settle a dispute with Antiochus III of Syria. Conversely, Hannibal, now a 
lonely figure in exile, had been acting as counsel to Antiochus III. Hannibal’s legend was such 
that the Syrians were willing to pay handsomely for his strategic insights, as war with Rome 
seemed ever more likely. In his Ab Urbe Condita, Titus Livius Patavinus (‘Livy’, 59 BC-AD 17) 
recorded the meeting between the two great generals at Ephesus after fate had, once again, 
thrown them together. 
 
2 
 
[Scipio] Africanus asked who Hannibal [Barca] thought had been the greatest 
general, and Hannibal replied that it was Alexander of Macedon, because with 
a small force he had defeated armies of immense proportions and penetrated to 
the ends of the earth, which human beings had never expected to visit. When 
Scipio then asked whom Hannibal would rank second, his answer was that it 
was Pyrrhus: it was he who first taught the technique of laying out a camp and, 
in addition, no one had selected his terrain and deployed his troops with more 
finesse. He also had a way of gaining men’s support, so that the peoples of 
Italy to be ruled by a foreign king than by the Roman people, despite the 
latter’s long hegemony in the land. Scipio went on to ask whom he considered 
third, and Hannibal replied that it was obviously Hannibal himself. Scipio burst 
into laughter, and retorted: ‘What would your answer be if you had defeated 
me?’. ‘In that case’, Hannibal replied, ‘I should have said that I was ahead of 
both Alexander and Pyrrhus, and all the other generals in the world.’7 
 
Whatever the accuracy of Livy’s account,8 the notion of former adversaries engaging in mutual 
reflection by means of post-conflict discourse is an appealing one and such conversations have 
often been the stuff of parlour games amongst scholars and intellectuals.9 (These are taken to 
their logical, and often perverse, extremes in on-line forums where hours of effort are expended 
on participants asking question such as ‘What would (Soviet) Marshal Georgi Zhukov and 
(German) Field Marshal Erich von Manstein have discussed had they met after the Second 
World War?’). But what we have here is, for those animated by a similarly-motivated curiosity, a 
rather remarkable piece of historical and intelligence literature. Given all of this, the bringing 
together of two former heads of the Indian and Pakistani intelligence services is inevitably going 
to result in what will be termed a ‘ground-breaking’ book. As one Indian reviewer noted 
recently: 
 
Sometimes, books take on a life of their own because of the way they capture 
the zeitgeist or tap into a subject that is central to the lives of millions of 
people. In the case of The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace, 
it is a bit of both. Let’s face it, there will never be a dearth of books about 
India-Pakistan relations and a fascination for the subject among people of both 
countries. Even more so at a time when things seem to be going disastrously 
for the relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, given their failure to deal 
with the fallout of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and more recent incidents such as 
the terror attacks in Pathankot and Uri and the surgical strikes on the LoC.10 
 
It is not surprising that The Spy Chronicles is the subject of so much attention. It is authored by 
two former intelligence chiefs – one from India and one from Pakistan - with a journalist 
moderating their discussions. The individuals are A.S. Dulat, Secretary of India’s Research and 
Analysis Wing (commonly known as RAW, but referred to within the Indian government as 
R&AW)11 from 1999 to 2000; Asad Durrani, Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI)12 from 1990 to 1991; and Indian journalist Aditya Sinha. Each former 
intelligence chief gained valuable insight by having served as head of his foreign intelligence 
services as well as domestic or military intelligence and in advisory or diplomatic positions. 
Indian journalist and writer Barkha Dutt13 wrote ‘the idea that the erstwhile captains of their 
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covert agencies should even talk amiably, leave alone co-author a book, is unimaginable.’14 Yet, 
the reality is ISI and RAW intelligence heads have been meeting and writing together as part of a 
Track II (‘backchannel) diplomatic effort for years.15 Of note here is the Intelligence Dialogue, 
organised by Peter Jones of the University of Ottawa, which has featured Dulat and Durrani. 
This cooperative spirit has also seen the two intelligence chiefs jointly authored articles in 2011 
and 2013.16 More recently, Dulat debated with Ehsan ul Haq, former Director-General of ISI 
from 2001 to 2004, publicly at the London School of Economics about intelligence services’ 
positive contributions.17 Figures such as Dulat amd Durrani have long been shrouded in mystery 
and mired in controversy. This is hardly surprising as senior security officials from the Indian 
sub-continent and figures from the world of intelligence anywhere, will always arouse curiosity. 
From its inception, RAW has been criticised for its lack of accountability – to both the Indian 
parliament and the Indian people, which is reinforced by the fact that RAW reports only to the 
Indian prime minister. Those heading the RAW have, naturally, come under a great deal of 
scrutiny, and idiosyncratic eccentrics such as Dulat are the subject of a great deal of comment. In 
2015, one Indian reviewer of a book of Dulat’s noted that  
 
For years, Dulat was a mysterious character from a spy thriller, who seemed to 
be everywhere in Kashmir, trying to win over separatist leaders and elected 
officials for New Delhi. Unlike his peers, he had been a spy who used words 
and cash as weapons. He lured top militants into giving up arms. He charmed 
separatists with lofty promises of peace. Where words didn’t work, he used 
money to buy their loyalty.18 
 
In his own country, Durrani is undoubtedly regarded as a more controversial figure than Dulat. 
This is due not least to the reputation of the ISI internationally: a few years ago Ali Dayan 
Hasan, a South Asian expert at Human Rights Watch, asserted that ‘the Pakistan army, through 
its intelligence agencies, is the principal abuser of human rights in Pakistan.’19 Such beliefs were 
reinforced by accusations, like those made by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1994, 
which posited that General Durrani and General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former Pakistani Chief of 
Staff, had sought to sell heroin in order to finance covert military operations in 1991. Durrani, by 
then Pakistan’s ambassador to Germany, denied this stating: ‘This is a preposterous thing for a 
former prime minister to say. I know nothing about it. We never ever talked on this subject at 
all.’ 20  By his own admission Durrani was certainly no angel, having acknowledged providing 
money to the parties ranged against Benazir Bhutto during the 199021 and 1993 Pakistani general 
elections. In a BBC interview Durrani later recalled that ‘[a]fter seeing the period that she had 
ruled, I thought it would be better if the lady [i.e. Benazir Bhutto] did not come to power’.22 It is 
small wonder that we now have conformation of the involvement of so many figures in the 
Pakistani military, political and intelligence elites in her assassination in December 2007.23 In 
her posthumously published book, Reconciliation, Benazir Bhutto named a man who she 
believed had tried to procure bombs for an unsuccessful attempt on her life in Karachi in October 
2007: 
 
I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb 
blasts were planned … a bomb maker was needed for the bombs. Enter Qari 
Saifullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second 
government. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was 
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languishing in the Karachi central jail … The officials in Lahore had turned to 
Akhtar for help. His liaison with elements in the government was a radical who 
was asked to make the bombs and he himself asked for a fatwa making it 
legitimate to oblige. He got one.24 
 
Benazir Bhutto is but one of the countless victims of the endless wars, plots, terrorist outrages 
and intrigues in both Pakistan and India. Since 1947 relations between India and Pakistan have 
been complex and largely hostile. Indo-Pakistani affairs are often defined by the legacy of the 
violent partition of British India (which displaced up to 12.5 million people and saw the deaths 
of a million others); the endless conflict over the divided province of Kashmir; and the stasis 
imposed by military tension and arms racing between the two states.25 Shruti Kapila recently 
succinctly identified the results of all of this: 
 
Since [1947] India and Pakistan have been to war four times. Hostility, 
and the spectre of nuclear war, still hang over the two neighbours.26 In 
this critical sense, Ambedkar’s faith in the idea of partition and Pakistan 
has certainly failed to bring about peaceful, if distant, relations. Nor has 
[Sir Cyril] Radcliffe’s boundary proved to be a stable line of 
demarcation. Ever since the initial war of 1948, Kashmir has remained 
in a permanent state of dispute. In 1947, instead of the strategic sense 
that today prevails over discussions on the province, Kashmir as a 
Muslim-majority province represented India’s claim and commitment to 
diversity. Not only has Pakistan laid claim to parts of it since then, 
today it is one of the most militarised zones in the world, with its 
citizens condemned to a hostage status between two belligerent and 
ideologically opposed neighbours.27 
 
Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that the diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad 
has been plagued by mutual hostility and suspicion for over seventy years now. Naturally, what 
we might term a long cold war between India and Pakistan has permeated both societies. And, 
given the nature of such conflicts, intelligence services have been very much at the fore in both 
states. There are innumerable examples here. Fr example: Islamabad has seen RAW as a key 
obstacle to its nuclear programme, and India’s diplomatic initiatives in Afghanistan have 
always been dismissed as a cover for RAW agents working to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan 
has accused RAW of training and arming separatists in Pakistan’s Balochistan province 
along the Afghan border. RAW denies these charges, and in turn, accuses the ISI of 
sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, of the July 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul 
and of instigating the 26/11 attacks. Thus, the era and the events featured in The Spy 
Chronicles demonstrate how the goals and efforts of the intelligence leaders can be politicised by 
other sectors of government, the body politic and society in both India and Pakistan. Durrani 
could not attend the book launch in New Delhi after being denied a visa by the Indian 
government so he sent a video message that was played at the event, giving ‘a very special 
thank[s] to the Indian deep state. By denying me the visa, they have saved me from the wrath of 
our hawks [in Pakistan]. They will be happy to know that I have not yet been cleared by the 
[Indian officials resident in the] South Block’!28 The Indian government was not the only one to 
react in such a fashion, however. The Pakistani authorities placed Durrani on the Exit Control 
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List, preventing him from leaving the country, and the General Headquarters of the Pakistan 
Army initiated an inquiry.29 Indeed, publishing the book posed serious risks for the men and the 
consequences for Durrani are ongoing. 
 
The book is not a narrative in one voice. Rather it is composed of hundreds of pages of dialogue 
between the two former intelligence chiefs. Drawn from four in-person conversations between 
the two men (that were hosted in Nepal, Thailand, and Turkey), Aditya Sinha explains the 
discussions ‘had a lot of spontaneity and the two former chiefs got into the spirit of each 
discussion’ and ‘I have tried to retain that tone in the manuscript’ (p. xiii). The Spy Chronicles 
comprises thirty-three chapters divided in seven parts with fully referenced meetings that centred 
on specific themes. There is a preface by Sinha about the book’s origins and the interview 
process, and an introduction by Dulat and Durrani with biographical details. Opening with the 
genesis of their relationship and the purpose of the book, Dulat and Durrani discuss their mutual 
respect and the difficulty they encountered in persuading governments to change policy to settle 
disputes, such as that over Kashmir. Next, Durrani explains how he ‘accidently’ joined 
Pakistan’s intelligence community by serving as an analyst then defence attaché under the 
administration of ISI, later getting promoted to lead Military Intelligence and subsequently ISI.  
 
Dulat and Durrani’s exchanges are not only reminders of the long history of mutual enmity and 
suspicion between the Indian and Pakistani states, but also of the commonalities intelligence 
leaders share and of a desire for peace on all sides. It is notable that both intelligence services are 
presented in the same volume as ISI is often mentioned by domestic and international media, but 
RAW is more obscure despite being a key player in India’s national security.30 That said, RAW 
is proud of its record and is quick to claim its successes whenever possible. These include the 
following episodes since 1968. 
 
 The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 
 India’s growing influence in Afghanistan 
 The northeast state of Sikkim’s accession to India in 1975 
 The security of India’s nuclear programme 
 The success of African liberation movements during the Cold War31 
 
The Spy Chronicles not only reveals differences and highlights the conflicts between the ISI and 
RAW, but also demonstrates cooperation between the opposing intelligence services. Notably, 
there is a discussion of the ‘rescue’ of Durrani’s son, Osman, who visited India in 2015 with a 
Pakistani passport, but his visa prevented his departure from an airport different from the one he 
arrived at. Needing help, Durrani called Dulat, who in turn ‘spoke to a former colleague in 
RAW’ and a friend from India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) who helped Osman navigate Indian 
bureaucracy and leave the country without incident (p. 17). Both Dulat and Durrani make 
comparisons and give appraisals of a number of different intelligence agencies across the globe. 
Dulat says, ‘if you took RAW and IB against the ISI or against Pakistan’s agencies, they are as 
good professionally’ (p. 38). Whereas, Durrani insists, ‘the best way to judge ISI was that during 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it got all the help from most of the big players in the West 
but allowed no interference in its role’ (p. 38). He also boasts: ‘Another accomplishment is none 
of our operators ever defected or was “caught on camera”’ (p. 38). As for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), both were critical with Durrani explaining, ‘I never rated CIA assessments 
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highly. Never. They don’t believe they have to carry out good assessments’ (p. 54). The thrust of 
US policy for the duration of the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was determined by US 
President Jimmy Carter in early 1980, when he initiated a program to arm the Mujahedeen 
through Pakistan’s ISI and secured a pledge from Saudi Arabia to match U.S. funding for this 
purpose. Pakistan’s president, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, skilfully managed to keep the 
profile of the CIA relatively low and he was, henceforth, seen as the champion of the 
downtrodden Muslim tribesmen of Afghanistan, with the ISI as the chief facilitators of the war 
against Godless communism.32 US support for the Mujahedeen accelerated under Carter’s 
successor, Ronald Reagan, at a final cost to the US of some $3 billion. The Soviets were unable 
to quell the insurgency and withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, precipitating the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union itself.33 In October 1983 a seminal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was 
presented by the Director of the CIA, William J. Casey, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He observed 
that United States was struggling to develop a viable strategy to counter the Soviets in 
Afghanistan due to the lack of well-organised, indigenous single resistance force. The plain truth 
was that the ‘resistance [needed] more simultaneous uprisings of a large number of villages and 
tribes’. As it was ‘the insurgency could not continue [with] the present level of outside support’. 
It was important to note that ‘Overt Soviet pressure [on the resistance] could require [an] 
additional US response.’ There was considerable danger, however, that ‘Covert pressure, 
designed to weaken the military regime [in Kabul], could ultimately contribute to an unstable 
political situation in Pakistan.’34 John Prados, writing for the US National Security Archive in 
2001, observed that the CIA ‘played a significant role in asserting U.S. influence in Afghanistan 
by funding military operations designed to frustrate the Soviet invasion of that country. CIA 
covert action worked through Pakistani intelligence services to reach Afghan rebel groups.’35 
 
In the relationship between India and Pakistan events are inter-connected in a bewildering series 
of conflicts, alliances and networks. Pakistan's support of the Afghan-based Taliban, which 
included the provision of sanctuary (making the Taliban a major force in Pakistan), was actually 
primarily rooted in Islamabad’s hope of acquiring the whole of Kashmir – and thus expelling the 
Indian state from the province forever.36 This is notable as many Pakistanis consider the battle 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to be the time when their country’s involvement with 
violent jihadism began. Pakistan’s president at the time, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was 
particularly sympathetic to Deobandism37 and instigated a national programme of ‘Islamisation’. 
Saudi Arabia provided staunch support for Pakistan in its long-standing dispute with India over 
Kashmir (a situation which the Saudis liken to that of Israel and the Palestinians).38 The links, 
connections and networks outlined in The Spy Chronicles are global. Duranni thus, for example, 
discusses Federal Republic of Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND),39 arguing that ‘the 
German BND works methodically, seriously. Germans anyway are serious people. But their 
product is sometimes not up to the mark’ (p. 56).40 (Fortunately, such ‘pop’ psychology is rare in 
the volume). Commenting on the most dangerous area of Indo-Pakistani tension, Durrani and 
Dulat discuss terrorism. Pakistan has long been accused of being a sponsor of international 
terrorism (not least by India). Certainly, the ISI has been a long-time patron to international 
Mujahedeen forces, many of them Pakistan-based Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation 
that Islamabad may have facilitated rise of the ISIS. As ever in Pakistan, however, things are far 
from being black-and-white. Islamabad protests (correctly) that it, too, is itself a victim of 
terrorism.41 In The Spy Chronicles,  Durrani repeatedly asserts that ISI ‘probably’ learned about 
Osama bin Laden’s location and ‘perhaps’ provided information to the United States for the US 
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SEAL Team Six raid in May 2011, but claimed ‘ignorance’ (p. 24). This contradicts statements 
by the leadership elites in Pakistan, such as that made by the then Pakistani President Asif Ali 
Zardari, when he denied the killing was a ‘joint [US-Pakistan] operation’. In addition, former 
senior intelligence officials, including Hamid Gul, ISI Director-General from 1987 to 1989, 
stated plainly that ‘It was quite surprising that [bin Laden] was in Pakistan.’42 Durrani and Dulat 
also discuss long-standing Indian accusations that Islamabad arms and finances terrorist groups. 
Durrani responds to the notion that Kashmir is actually a burden for not just India, but Pakistan, 
explaining ‘we did not know how far it would go’ and ‘our challenge’ was keeping it from 
letting it ‘out of control’ (p. 39). Dulat says that India ‘saw the Kashmir development in 1989-90 
as inspired, monitored and supported by Pakistan’ and it ‘went out of control’ to which Durrani 
replied, ‘On Kashmir I defer to my friend because of his knowledge and experience are more 
[sic]’ (p. 88). The two also share thoughts about Indian-Pakistan relations, noting the lasting 
effects of the Partition and the good points and strains of the bilateral ties, such as praising Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s vision and attempts to improve relations. They explore key 
personalities, history, missed opportunities and the current policy under Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi. Durrani concludes, ‘If you move forward on Kashmir, then you are automatically moving 
forward on terrorism’ (p. 106). Cast in such a fashion, this resembles nothing so much as the 
strategy of ‘linkage’, once so beloved of the geopolitical vision of Henry Kissinger.43 
 
The two intelligence chiefs are careful, unsurprisingly, not to divulge any classified operations 
from their time as leaders of their respective agencies. However, that does not stop them from 
discussing intelligence tradecraft, which provides insight into methods. Regarding allegations 
that India uses its diplomatic missions for espionage, Durrani explains that ‘If Indian consulates 
are used, we’ll be happy’ because Pakistan ‘can keep track’ but, he claims, ‘espionage is usually 
not done from there’ (p. 195). This is an interesting statement as Pakistan has a well-documented 
history of heavy-handed tactics to ‘paralyse’ the Research and Analysis Wing ‘as far as embassy-
based espionage was concerned.’44 In fact, Maloy Krishna Dhar, a former Joint Director of 
India’s Intelligence Bureau, previously wrote that when Indian intelligence caught and expelled 
Pakistani intelligence officers based at diplomatic missions in India, ‘Pakistan always reacted 
with usual crudity and violence.’45 Even more surprising is Dulat’s revelation that Indian 
intelligence’s ‘biggest failure against Pakistan is that we’ve not been able to turn around an ISI 
officer or have an ISI officer working for us ... [or, at least,] not to my knowledge, at a level 
where it counts’ (p. 39). 
 
Dulat and Durrani also discuss ‘flashpoints’ and geopolitics. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Durrani 
explains, had negative consequences for Pakistan, but high domestic political costs prevent the 
militant leader Hafiz Saeed from being held criminally accountable,46 much to the fury of the 
Indian government.47 (In 2018, during an interview with newspaper Dawn, Pakistan’s former 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif indirectly accepted Islamabad’s culpability for not preventing the 
Mumbai attacks).48 As for Kulbhushan Jadhav, the RAW officer arrested by Pakistan, Durrani 
argues usually one party announces ‘[y]ou can have your fellow back but we want both of ours’ 
and exchange intelligence officers (p. 190). Dulat responded that if was an Indian operation, it 
was conducted poorly and that ‘I’m always surprised when anybody says we are fanning 
discontent, or paying for it, or training terrorists’ because ‘I headed the RAW, and it didn’t 
happen in our time’ (p. 195). In terms of broader geopolitics, neither men believe the Trump 
administration will change United States foreign policy towards Afghanistan (although Durrani, 
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rather predictably, assesses that the US would favour India if it were a mediator over Kashmir). 
In truth, the testimony of both men tends to support Thomas Powers’ Chamberlainesque 
assertion of US involvement in the theatre. ‘Forty-plus years after our failure in Vietnam, the 
United States [of America] is again fighting an endless war in a faraway place against a culture 
and a people we don’t understand for political reasons that make sense in Washington, but 
nowhere else.’49 
 
In recent years reports from the sub-continent indicate that the traditionally intransigent Pakistani 
military now favours a détente with India as international isolation for Islamabad beckons. In an 
influential speech given in October 2017 the Pakistan army’s chief of staff, General Qamar 
Javed Bajwa, warned that regional tensions were causing economic difficulties for all. 
Cooperation was heralded as essential: ‘The region will sink or sail together. I want to convey 
to our neighbours to the east and to the west that our destinies are inextricably linked’. Bajwa 
went on to warn that ‘[w]e are making a deliberate and concerted effort to pacify the western 
border through a multitude of diplomatic, military and economic initiative’. This mean that 
Islamabad had ‘also expressed and demonstrated our genuine desire to have normal and 
peaceful relations with India, however, it takes two to tango.’50 A year later Pakistan’s 
Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said that ‘We want to move forward and we are trying 
our best to have good ties with all our neighbors, including India ... [and as] General Bajwa says, 
regions prosper, countries don’t. India cannot prosper by weakening Pakistan.’51 And, by way of 
a conclusion on the progress of a tentative détente between the two states, Dulat and Durrani 
debate a path forward for India and Pakistan. In this section, they present separate lists of ideas, 
Durrani offering a ‘structured’ list of formal channels between government officials and Dulat 
calling for more people-to-people contact, trade and travel. Here Dulat argues that ‘[s]tructures 
have screwed us’ and the countries must ‘break the ice somewhere’ (p. 269). They also talk 
about institutionalizing India-Pakistan intelligence exchanges and making the station chiefs 
declared posts to facilitate interaction and meetings. Concluding the book, Dulat says ‘our main 
theme has been that India and Pakistan need to realise and get together because there is so much 
to be gained by understanding each other’ (p. 298). 
 
In his Ab Urbe Condita Livy recorded the impact that Hannibal’s remarks to Scipio had made at 
the meeting in Ephesus in 193 BC. ‘The cryptic answer [to Scipio’s question] with its Punic 
ingenuity and [the] unexpected mode of flattery [employed by Hannibal] had a profound effect 
on Scipio, according to Claudius – Hannibal had set him apart from ordinary commanders as 
being of incalculable worth.’52 Contemporary readers will no doubt find themselves at times as 
impressed when reading The Spy Chronicles. And, make no mistake about it, The Spy Chronicles 
is a must-read book for scholars of intelligence, security and politics in South Asia. Beyond 
some fascinating instances both of confirmation and of denial of intelligence service activity, the 
intelligence chiefs demonstrate their pragmatism towards their rivals. As one reviewer notes: ‘the 
sense of comradeship that seems to have formed between Dulat and Durrani, [makes them] come 
across as great raconteurs.’ For that same reviewer, the real strengths of the book lie in ‘their 
insights on the handling of Kashmir and other issues such as sharing of river waters and 
terrorism that are bedevilling India-Pakistan relations which should be the subject of 
dispassionate study for policy and decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad.’ Indeed, it 
seems to the case that  
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Durrani clearly appears not to be convinced that things could change under the 
current dispensation in New Delhi, including National Security Advisor Ajit 
Doval, while Dulat emerges as unusually optimistic about the chances of all or 
any form dialogue - be it between the two countries or between them and the 
Kashmiris. More than anything else, the most striking aspect of the book is the 
sense of hope that pervades many of the conversations between two deft 
practitioners of hard-nosed, cold-blooded analysis and espionage who, one 
would have thought, would be more willing to throw up their hands and walk 
away from it all, given the numerous ups and downs that have buffeted the 
relationship between India and Pakistan in recent years.53 
 
The Spy Chronicles has a number of limitations. First, it does not ‘tell all.’ Those hoping to get 
details on specific operations or structures of clandestine networks will be disappointed. Second, 
the book’s design with hundreds of dialog transcript pages means there are many disparate ideas 
and shifts in thought, making it a valuable primary source document for specialists, but does not 
have a clear narrative, singular voice or the structure of an academic study. Third, Sinha hints 
that yet more discussions were not included, writing that when ‘the tape recorder’ was turned off 
after work ‘a few other retired spychiefs land in the room, their (lubricated) tongues loosen and 
the jokes begin to fly’ (p. 21). Fourthly, there are phrases throughout the book that are not 
translated into English, which can be frustrating for English-only readers. Nevertheless, it is a 
valuable work that provides insight into how South Asian intelligence leadership perceives and 
hopes to solve geopolitical issues. Having said all that, the two intelligence chiefs are walking a 
well-trodden path as regards Track II diplomacy in the relations between India and Pakistan. (For 
example: between April 28-30 2018, a team of Indian experts travelled to Islamabad and held 
discussions with their counterparts there on various aspects of bilateral ties).54 For several years, 
retired officers from both sides have been hawks in office and doves in retirement. Once out of 
power, however, these officers can no longer influence events. The Pakistan army’s repeated 
efforts to frustrate civilian governments look set to continue and the Indian government shows no 
sign of concrete movement towards rapprochement. It is a shame, but hardly surprising, that 
Durrani and Dulat did not feel able to express such mutual admiration when they were in office. 
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